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ABSTRACT In recent decades, we have witnessed the evolution of biometric technology from the first
pioneering works in face and voice recognition to the current state of development wherein a wide spectrum
of highly accurate systems may be found, ranging from largely deployed modalities, such as fingerprint,
face, or iris, to more marginal ones, such as signature or hand. This path of technological evolution has
naturally led to a critical issue that has only started to be addressed recently: the resistance of this rapidly
emerging technology to external attacks and, in particular, to spoofing. Spoofing, referred to by the term
presentation attack in current standards, is a purely biometric vulnerability that is not shared with other
IT security solutions. It refers to the ability to fool a biometric system into recognizing an illegitimate user
as a genuine one bymeans of presenting a synthetic forged version of the original biometric trait to the sensor.
The entire biometric community, including researchers, developers, standardizing bodies, and vendors, has
thrown itself into the challenging task of proposing and developing efficient protection methods against this
threat. The goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive overview on the work that has been carried out
over the last decade in the emerging field of antispoofing, with special attention to the mature and largely
deployed facemodality. The work covers theories, methodologies, state-of-the-art techniques, and evaluation
databases and also aims at providing an outlook into the future of this very active field of research.
INDEX TERMS Biometrics, security, anti-spoofing, face.
I. INTRODUCTION
‘‘Fingerprints cannot lie, but liars can make fingerprints’’.
Unfortunately, this paraphrase of an old quote attributed to
Mark Twain1 has been proven right in many occasions now.
And not only for fingerprints, but also for many other
biometric traits such as face, iris, voice or even gait.
Every technology has its own time. Since the first pio-
neering works on automatic voice and face recognition over
40 years ago [1]–[3], steady and continuous progress has been
made in the development of biometric technology. Driven
by the very appealing new security biometric paradigm
‘‘forget about cards and passwords, you are your own key’’,
researchers from many different fields such as image pro-
cessing, computer vision or pattern recognition, have applied
the newest techniques in each of these areas to improve the
1Figures do not lie, but liars do figure.
performance of biometric systems [4]. This path of
technological evolution has permitted the use of biometrics in
many diverse activities such as forensics, border and access
control, surveillance or on-line commerce.
In this scenario of constant expansion, and as a con-
sequence of its own natural progress, new concerns are
arising regarding biometric technology different from the
mere improvement of its recognition performance. Among
these new issues and challenges that have emerged around
biometrics, its resilience against external threats has lately
drawn a significant level of attention.
Currently it is an accepted fact that, as the deployment
of biometric systems keeps growing year after year in such
different environments as airports, laptops or mobile phones,
users are also becoming more familiar with their use in every-
day life and, as a result, their security weaknesses are better
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known to the general public. Nowadays, it is not difficult
to find websites with tutorial videos which give detailed
guidance on how to create fake masks, fingerprints or irises
that may be used to fool biometric systems.
Attacks are not any more restricted to a mere theo-
retical or academic sphere, but are starting to be carried
out against real operational applications. The fairly easy
hacking of the long anticipated new iPhone 5S fingerprint
reader, just a day after it hit the shelves and using a
regular and well-known type of fingerprint spoof [5], is
only another example in the list of practical attacks and
vulnerabilities of biometric systems that are being reported
to the public from hacking groups attempting to get
recognition [6]–[10], from real criminal cases [11]–[14], or
even from live demonstrations at biometric and security spe-
cific conferences [15], [16].
As a consequence, in recent years, there has been an
increasing interest on the evaluation of biometric systems
security, which has led to the creation of numerous and very
diverse initiatives focused on this field of research [17], [18]:
publication of many research works disclosing and evaluat-
ing different biometric vulnerabilities [19]–[24]; proposal of
new protection methods [25]–[28]; related books and book
chapters [29]–[31]; PhD and MSc Theses which propose
and analyse different biometric spoofing and anti-spoofing
techniques [32]–[39]; publication of several standards in the
area [40]–[42] and of different Supporting Documents and
Protection Profiles in the framework of the security evaluation
standard Common Criteria for the objective assessment of
commercial systems [43], [44]; certification of different com-
mercial products in the framework of the Common Criteria
[45]–[47]; patented anti-spoofing mechanisms for biometric
systems [48]–[50]; specific tracks, sessions and workshops
in biometric-specific and general signal processing confer-
ences [51]–[53]; organization of competitions focused on
vulnerability assessment [54]–[56], acquisition of specific
datasets [57]–[59]; creation of groups and laboratories spe-
cialized in the evaluation of biometric security [60]–[62];
European Projects with the biometric security topic as their
main research interest [63], [64].
All these initiatives clearly highlight the effort put by
all parties involved in the development of biometrics
(i.e., researchers, developers and industry) to improve the sys-
tems’ security in order to bring this technology to comparable
deployment levels to other well established security-related
solutions.
Among the different vulnerabilities analyzed, intensive
research efforts have been focused on the study of direct or
spoofing attacks. Spoofing is a purely biometric vulnerability
that is not shared with other IT security solutions. In these
attacks, intruders use some type of synthetically produced
artefact (e.g., face mask, gummy finger or printed iris image)
or try to mimic the behaviour of genuine users (e.g., gait,
signature), to fraudulently access the biometric system. This
way, spoofing takes advantage of the fact that our fingerprints,
face, iris, voice or even our DNA, are publicly
available data. This is one of the well-known drawbacks of
biometrics: ‘‘biometric traits are not secrets’’ [6], [65]–[67].
Such public dimension of biometrics is one of the main
reasons why spoofing has attracted a lot of interest not only
from researchers but also from general users who are seduced
by the ‘‘do-it-yourself’’ nature of these attacks. It is precisely
this characteristic that renders spoofing really dangerous, as
it transforms every user into a potential attacker.
The public, low-cost and low-tech features of spoofing are
well reported in the literature, where it has been shown in
different works that many, if not all, biometric modalities are
vulnerable to this threat [59], [68]–[76]. Therefore, nowadays
the question is not any more whether or not biometrics can
be copied or forged, but rather to what extent systems are
robust to these attacks and if they incorporate the necessary
countermeasures to detect them. However, counterfeiting this
type of threats is not a straight forward problem. As they
are performed in the analog domain and interaction with the
acquisition device is done following the regular protocol,
usual digital protection mechanisms are not effective
(e.g., encryption, digital signature or watermarking). As a
result, specific countermeasures that allow biometric sys-
tems detecting fake samples and rejecting them have to be
developed.
The spoofing biometric security context described above
has promoted in the last 10 years a significant amount of
research which has resulted in publications in journals, con-
ferences and media, describing new anti-spoofing algorithms
and systems that intend to make this technology safer. This
has been specially the case for some of the most deployed,
popular and mature modalities such as face, fingerprints and
iris, which have also been shown to be the most exposed
to spoofing. At the moment, the amount of new contribu-
tions and initiatives in the area of anti-spoofing requires
a significant condensation effort to keep track of all new
information in order to form a clear picture of the state-of-
the-art as of today. As an example, a series of chronological
milestones related to the evolution of biometric spoofing are
shown in Fig. 1. We are aware that there are other works
that merit being included in the diagram, however, due to
space restrictions, we have focused on those that, from our
point of view, can better help the reader to see the progress
of anti-spoofing algorithms both from a technological and a
performance perspective.
Similarly to what has been recently published for the fin-
gerprint modality [77]–[79], the current article is an attempt
to contribute to this difficult review task. It presents a compre-
hensive survey of anti-spoofingmethodologies proposed until
mid 2014 in the widely used face modality, following a sys-
tematic categorization. It also provides an overview of pub-
licly available evaluation benchmarks for face anti-spoofing
approaches, summarizing the detection rates achieved by
state-of-the-art methods in the international competitions that
have been organized up to date. The article concludes with
an outline of the lessons learnt in these more than 10 years of
intensive anti-spoofing research, and with a personal vision of
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FIGURE 1. Chronological evolution of biometric spoofing and anti-spoofing with a series of significant milestones that have been covered in this field so
far. All events are referenced throughout the article.
the challenges to be faced and possible future research lines
that may contribute to the general improvement of the security
level offered by biometric systems against spoofing.
In brief, the paper is thought as a tool to provide biometric
researchers, either newcomers or experts in security related
aspects of this technology, an overall picture of the current
panorama in biometric anti-spoofing with special focus on
the face trait. It also aims at presenting the current strengths,
shortcomings and challenges of these security protection
techniques. Although thework is thought to be self-contained,
some previous general knowledge on biometrics can help
to better understand some of the concepts introduced in the
article.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sect. II
some general anti-spoofing concepts are summarized and the
techniques classification that will be followed throughout
the paper is presented. In Sect. III the reader can find a
comprehensive survey of the different research works that
have been presented until mid 2014 in face anti-spoofing.
Sect. IV addresses the important issue of anti-spoofing eval-
uation and presents the datasets that are publicly available for
this purpose in the face modality. To conclude, the summary
and discussion, with some insight into the future, are given
in Sect. V.
II. BIOMETRIC ANTI-SPOOFING
In spite of some ongoing efforts and proposals to reach a uni-
fied and standardized nomenclature for vulnerability related
concepts, the biometric community has still not reached a
general agreement on the best terminology to be used in each
case [42], [80], [81].
In light of the absence of a closed definition, the present
article will follow the specialised literature where biometric
spoofing is widely understood as the ability to fool a biometric
system into recognizing an illegitimate user as a genuine one
by means of presenting to the sensor a synthetic forged
version (i.e., artefact) of the original biometric trait. Such
attacks, also referred to in some cases as direct attacks [33]
fall within the larger category ‘‘presentation attacks’’, defined
in the latest draft of the ISO/IEC 30107 standard as
‘‘presentation of an artefact or human characteristic to the
biometric capture subsystem in a fashion that could interfere
with the intended policy of the biometric system’’ [42]. Such
a wider group of attacks also includes the presentation to
the acquisition device of human characteristics (and not only
synthetic artefacts) such as dead fingers, mutilated traits, real
living traits under coercion or a different living trait (i.e., zero-
effort impostor attempts that try to take advantage of the False
Acceptance Rate, FAR, of biometric systems) [80].
Therefore, spoofing consists in using an artificial trait to
impersonate a different user or to create a new genuine iden-
tity. Several scenarios are typically conceived for spoofing
attacks depending on the type of biometric system considered.
(i) Verification system: In the most common case, spoofing is
carried out at the time of authentication by presenting to the
sensor a fake physical copy of the genuine’s user trait. Such
artefact is acquired and matched to the enrolled real template
of the genuine user. (ii) Verification system/Identification
system in closed set: Spoofing may also be performed at the
enrolment stage by generating a new identity with an artefact
(not necessarily imitating any real user’s trait) which can later
be used by different users to access the system. (iii) Identi-
fication system in open set: Typically this case corresponds
to look-up systems where a new identity is created using the
spoofing artefact to avoid being found in a watch list (e.g., to
obtain a VISA for illegally entering a country).
Given the above spoofing definition, an anti-spoofing
method is usually accepted to be any technique that is able
to automatically distinguish between real biometric traits
presented to the sensor and synthetically produced artefacts
containing a biometric trait. As in the spoofing case, although
it is a very extended one, this nomenclature is not carved
in stone and, very often, anti-spoofing approaches are also
referred to in the literature by the terms liveness detection
or vitality detection techniques. Rigorously speaking, both
terms (i.e., anti-spoofing and liveness detection) are not fully
equivalent, as not all anti-spoofing methods are necessarily
based on cues directly related to living features of biometric
traits. However, in practice, they are used as synonyms in the
majority of cases. Therefore, in the present article we will not
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FIGURE 2. General diagram of a biometric system specifying the modules where the three types of anti-spoofing techniques may be
integrated (sensor-level, feature-level and score-level). Also displayed are the two different type of attacks for which anti-spoofing
techniques may offer protection: spoofing and attacks carried out with synthetic or reconstructed samples.
make any difference between them. It is also worth noting that
certain anti-spoofing techniques may also be highly effective
to detect other types of presentation attacks (e.g., dead or
mutilated traits).
Anti-spoofing methods represent a challenging engineer-
ing problem as they have to satisfy certain demanding require-
ments [82]: (i) non-invasive: these techniques should in no
case be harmful or require an excessive contact with the user;
(ii) user friendly: users should not be reluctant to interact with
them; (iii) fast: results should be generated in a reduced lapse
of time as users’ interaction with the sensor should be kept as
short as possible; (iv) low cost: wide use cannot be expected
if the cost is excessively high; (v) performance: in addition to
a good fake detection rate, the protection scheme should not
degrade the recognition performance of the biometric system
(e.g., false rejection).
From a general perspective, anti-spoofing techniques may
be classified into one of three groups depending on the
biometric system module in which they are integrated
(see Fig. 2):
• Sensor-Level Techniques. Usually referred to in the
literature by the term hardware-based techniques. These
methods add some specific device to the sensor in order
to detect particular properties of a living trait (e.g., facial
thermogram, blood pressure, fingerprint sweat, or spe-
cific reflection properties of the eye). As shown
in Fig. 2, such techniques are integrated in the biometric
sensor. In general, hardware-based approaches mea-
sure one of three characteristics, namely: (i) intrinsic
properties of a living body, including physical prop-
erties (e.g., density or elasticity), electrical properties
(e.g., capacitance, resistance or permittivity), spectral
properties (e.g., reflectance and absorbance at given
wavelengths) or even visual properties (e.g., colour and
opacity); (ii) involuntary signals of a living body
which can be attributed to the nervous system. Good
examples are the pulse, blood pressure, perspira-
tion, pupillary unrest (hippus), brain wave signals
(EEG) or electric heart signals; (iii) responses to
external stimuli, also known as challenge-response
methods, which require the user cooperation as they
are based on detecting voluntary (behavioural) or
involuntary (reflex reactions) responses to an external
signal. Examples of such methods can be the pupil con-
traction after a lighting event (reflex), or the head move-
ment following a random path determined by the system
(behavioural).
In the present work multibiometric techniques are
included in this category [34], [83], [84], although, in
some cases, they could reasonably be classified as well
in the feature-level methods (described next). Multibio-
metric anti-spoofing is based on the hypothesis that the
combination of different biometrics will increase the
robustness to direct attacks, as, in theory, generating
several fake traits is presumed to be more difficult than
an individual trait. Following this assumption, multi-
modal approaches fuse different modalities. Generally,
the strategy followed is to use complementary traits in
terms of performance and vulnerabilities. Accordingly,
very accurate traits vulnerable to spoofing (e.g., fin-
gerprints) are combined with traits robust to spoofing
with low recognition rates (e.g., the finger vein pattern).
Such a strategy requires additional hardware acquisition
devices, therefore these techniques may be included in
the sensor-level group of anti-spoofing methods. Note
that the above hypothesis (i.e., circumventing a multi-
biometric system implies breaking all unimodal mod-
ules) has already been shown to be untrue as, in many
cases, bypassing just one of the unimodal subsystems
is enough to gain access to the complete
application [75], [85]–[88]. Therefore, multibiometry by
itself does not necessarily guarantee a higher level of
protection against spoofing attacks. As such, specific
protection schemes for multibiometric systems have
started to be recently studied [32], [89].
• Feature-Level Techniques. Usually referred to in the
literature by the term software-based techniques. In this
case the fake trait is detected once the sample has been
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FIGURE 3. General classification of anti-spoofing methods considered in the present article with the three main groups depicted in Fig. 2: sensor-level,
feature-level and score-level techniques.
acquired with a standard sensor. As such, features used
to distinguish between real and fake traits are extracted
from the biometric sample (usually images, as in the case
of face, or some kind of time-functions, as in the case
of speech), and not directly from the human body as in
the case of sensor-level techniques. These methods are
integrated after the sensor, usually functioning as part
of the feature extractor module (as shown in Fig. 2).
They can be further classified into static and dynamic
anti-spoofing methods, depending on whether they work
with only one instance of the biometric trait, or with a
sequence of samples captured over time [90]. Although
they may present some degradation in performance,
in general, static features are preferable over dynamic
techniques as they usually require less cooperation from
the user, which makes them faster and less intrusive.
Such a subdivision into static and dynamic approaches
is of special interest in face recognition, where there
exist systemsworking on single facial images (e.g., pass-
port picture) and on video sequences (e.g., surveillance
camera).
Although, for clarity, multimodality will be considered
in the article as a sensor-level type of anti-spoofing
countermeasure, some of these approaches can also be
included in the present group. For instance, from just one
single high resolution image of a face we may perform
both face and iris recognition. In this particular case,
a multimodal strategy is being applied at the feature
extractor level, with no need of any additional hardware
or sensing device.
An appealing characteristic of software-based tech-
niques is that, as they operate directly on the acquired
sample (and not on the biometric trait itself), they are
potentially capable of detecting other types of illegal
break-in attempts not necessarily classified as spoofing
attacks. For instance, feature-level methods can pro-
tect the system against the injection of reconstructed
or synthetic samples2 into the communication channel
between the sensor and the feature extractor as depicted
in Fig. 2 [91]–[93].
• Score-Level Techniques. Recently, a third group of
protection methods which falls out of the traditional
two-type classification (software- and hardware-based),
has started to be analyzed in the field of fingerprint
anti-spoofing. These protection techniques, much less
common than the previous two categories, are focused
on the study of biometric systems at score-level in order
to propose fusion strategies that increase their resistance
against spoofing attempts. Due to their limited perfor-
mance, they are designed as supplementary measures
to the sensor-level and feature-level techniques pre-
sented above, and are usually integrated in the matcher
(as shown in Fig. 2). The scores to be combined may
come from: i) two or more unimodal biometric modules;
ii) unimodal biometric modules and anti-spoofing tech-
niques; or iii) only results from anti-spoofing modules.
A graphical diagram of the categorization proposed above
is given in Fig. 3. Although the present article will follow
this three-group taxonomy, this is not a closed classification
and some techniques may fall into one or more of these
groups (e.g., as already mentioned, some multibiometric
methods could be a good border-line example). Nonetheless,
we believe that this taxonomy can help to get a clearer picture
of the current biometric anti-spoofing scene. As well, the
reader should be aware that, even though this is a quite
extended and accepted classification, others are also possible.
It is also worth highlighting that the three types of anti-
spoofing approaches presented here are not exclusive, and
may be coupled in order to improve the overall security
of the system. In fact, the two most deployed methods
described above (hardware- and software-based), have certain
2Please note the difference between a synthetic artefact (physical) used in
spoofing attacks, and a synthetic sample (digital)
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TABLE 1. Coarse comparison between the types of anti-spoofing techniques considered in the work (see Fig. 3) according to their general compliance
with the requirements defined in [82]. The last column shows the potential ability of anti-spoofing techniques to detect eventual non-spoofing attacks
such as the ones carried out with synthetic or reconstructed samples as shown in Fig. 2.
advantages and drawbacks so that, in general, a combination
of both would be the most desirable protection strategy to
increase the security of biometric systems. As a coarse com-
parison, sensor-level schemes usually present a higher fake
detection rate, while feature-level techniques are in general
less expensive (as no extra device is needed), less intrusive
and more user-friendly since their implementation is trans-
parent to the user. As already mentioned, score-level protec-
tion techniques present a much lower performance and are
designed only to support sensor- or feature-level protection
measures.
As general reference, Table 1 presents a comparative sum-
mary, for the three classes considered in the article, of some
of the most relevant characteristics that are desirable in anti-
spoofing protection schemes [82]. The table should be under-
stood only as a very broad indication of their capabilities.
Therefore, in practice, a specific individual study should
be carried out for each proposed anti-spoofing algorithm in
order to determine its level of compliance with each of these
features.
In the following, as a concrete and very representative
example of the research carried out in the field of spoofing,
we present a comprehensive review of themost successful and
popular anti-spoofing methods which have been proposed in
the literature for the face biometric.
III. STATE-OF-THE-ART IN FACE ANTI-SPOOFING
Two main reasons have driven us to select the face biometric
as the focal point of the present anti-spoofing survey:
• On the one hand, according to the International
Biometric Group (IBG), face is the second most largely
deployed biometric at world level in terms of market
quota right after fingerprints [94]. It is also adopted in
most official identification documents such as the
ICAO-compliant biometric passport [95] or national
ID cards [96]. As such, nowadays face is one of the
biometric traits with the highest potential impact both
from an economic and a social point of view.
• On the other hand, together with the fingerprint trait,
it is very likely the biometric where most spoofing-
related research has been conducted, leading to a very
large amount of published works. However, unlike in
the fingerprint case [77]–[79], there is still no rigorous
and comprehensive survey covering all the anti-spoofing
methods proposed in the field of face recognition. The
current article attempts to fill this gap.
Before reviewing the different works that have been pro-
posed as protection methods against direct attacks, a brief
summary of the most common face spoofing techniques is
presented. This initial short overview on spoofing can be use-
ful to understand the rationale behind the design of some anti-
spoofing techniques later presented and also to understand the
structure of the evaluation databases described in Sect. IV.
A. FACE SPOOFING
The use of masks or facial disguises to avoid being recog-
nized is a practice which has been observed for centuries
in the vast majority of known civilizations. Following this
trend, probably the most modern version of this long-going
tradition to change oneself’s physical appearance, is the use
of plastic surgery, which is becoming more and more pop-
ular thanks to the availability of advanced technology, its
affordable cost, and the speed with which these procedures
are now performed. Recently, it has been shown that, in spite
of some efforts to develop specific algorithms robust to facial
surgery changes [97]–[99], the problem of recognizing a
person after undergoing this type of operations is still an open
challenge for automatic face authentication systems [100].
Even without turning to irreversible treatments, some works
have also shown that face-based biometric systems may be
circumvented just by wearing regular make-up [101].
The afore mentioned techniques (i.e., face masks, plastic
surgery and make-up) are usually used to hide the user’s own
identity (i.e., Bob denies being Bob) and not to perform an
attack in which Bob tries to impersonate John. However, it has
recently been shown at a live demonstration in a biometric-
dedicated conference that this security scenario could change,
and that methods such as surgery or make-up may be suc-
cessfully used to perform direct attacks. In this conference,
a female intruder was able to access a face recognition system
in the place of a male user just by wearing some adequate
make-up [16].
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FIGURE 4. General classification of face spoofing techniques studied in
the literature. Grey arrows indicate the face recognition technology for
which each attack represents a potential threat.
Apart from these still limited examples on the potential
use of disguise techniques for spoofing purposes, the vast
majority of face direct attacks reported in the literature may
be classified in one of two groups, as shown in Fig. 4,
depending on whether the artefacts used are: i) 2D surfaces
(e.g., photo, video) which are successful against 2D face
recognition systems (see grey arrows in Fig. 4), or ii) 3D
volumes (e.g., masks) which may be used to attack 2D, 2.5D
and 3D face recognition technology. Such artefacts have been
used to carry out three main types of attacks which present an
increasing level of spoofing potential:
• Photo Attacks. These fraudulent access attempts are
carried out presenting to the recognition system a pho-
tograph of the genuine user. The photograph may have
been taken by the attacker using a digital camera, or
even retrieved from the internet after the user himself
uploaded it to one of the very popular online social
networks available today [67].
The image can then be printed on a paper (i.e., print
attacks, which were the first to be systematically studied
in the literature) or may be displayed on the screen of
a digital device such as a mobile phone or a tablet
(i.e., digital-photo attacks) [15], [59], [102]. A slightly
more advanced type of photo-attack that has also been
studied is the use of photographic masks. These masks
are high resolution printed photographs where eyes and
mouth have been cut out. At the time of the attack the
impostor is placed behind [103], so that certain face
movements such as eye blinking are reproduced.
• Video Attacks. Also referred in some cases as replay
attacks. They represent a more sophisticated version of
the simple photo spoofs. In this case, the attacker does
not use a still image, but replays a video of the genuine
client using a digital device (e.g., mobile phone, tablet or
laptop) [104], [105]. Such attacks appeared as a further
step in the evolution of face spoofing and are more
difficult to detect, as not only the face 2D texture is
copied but also its dynamics.
• Mask Attacks. In these cases the spoofing artefact is
a 3D mask of the genuine client’s face, increasing the
difficulty to find accurate countermeasures against them.
Since the complete 3D structure of the face is imitated,
the use of depth cues which could be a solution to
prevent the previous two types of attacks (carried out
with flat surfaces), becomes inefficient against this par-
ticular threat.
Although the possibility to bypass a biometric system
wearing a mask imitating the face of a different user is
an idea that has been circulating for some time [106],
these attacks are far less common than the previous
two categories. Face-mask spoofing has only started to
be systematically studied with the acquisition of the
first mask-specific datasets [107], [108], which include
masks of different materials and sizes [109], [110].
In part, the scarcity of research works addressing this
potential threat may be put down to the technical and
economic difficulty posed by the generation of large
databases of realistic masks. However, these obstacles
have been significantly lessened with the recent emer-
gence of some companies where such 3D face models
may be obtained for a reasonable price.3 Furthermore,
self-manufacturing a face mask is also becoming more
feasible and easier each day with the new generation of
affordable 3D acquisition sensors,4 dedicated scanning
software5 and the price decrease of 3D printing devices.6
All previous attacks have a number of variants depending
on the resolution of the spoofing device, the type of support
used to present the fake copy (e.g., handheld or fixed sup-
port), or the external variability allowed (e.g., illumination
or background conditions). These different attack versions
may be found in the face spoofing databases available for
research [54], [59], [102], [105], [107], [108], [111], which
are reviewed in Sect. IV-C.
It is also worth highlighting that face recognition systems
may also be subjected to attacks from identical twins claiming
to be the same person. Strictly speaking these are not spoofing
attacks (as there is no physical artifact involved) but rather
zero-effort impostor attempts in which Bob presents his own
biometric trait while trying to access the system as John.
Although some of the anti-spoofing techniques that will be
reviewed in the following sections could potentially be used
against this particular vulnerability, it will not be treated in
3www.thatsmyface.com; https://shapify.me; www.sculpteo.com
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinect; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PrimeSense
5www.skanect.com; www.kscan3d.com; www.fablitec.com
6www.sharebot.it/; http://cubify.com
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the present article. We refer the interested reader to some
specific works on this topic to understand the implications
and performance of face recognition systems in the presence
of twins [112]–[115].
B. FACE ANTI-SPOOFING
Although the first face anti-spoofing works date back more
than a decade [129], it has not been until the last three
years that this technology has experimented a real revolu-
tion under the umbrella of the TABULA RASA European
project focused on the study of spoofing attacks to biometric
systems [64]. Another decisive factor for the development of
new protection methods against direct attacks has been the
acquisition and distribution of several public face spoofing
databases, that have made possible for researchers to focus
on the design of efficient countermeasures and not on data
acquisition issues [102], [104], [105], [107]. Both factors
have fostered the recent publication of multiple techniques in
2D face anti-spoofing and to initiate a promising research line
in new protection algorithms for 3D face recognition systems
against mask attacks.
In the next sections we review the works that have
addressed so far the challenging problem of face anti-
spoofing. To this end, we follow the general categorization
presented in Sect. II and depicted in Fig. 3. As overall
reference, the advantages and drawbacks of each general
group of techniques are summarized in Table 3. However,
to understand the specific potential uses of every particular
algorithm readers are referred to corresponding works.
As may be seen in Table 3, it is difficult to clearly select
one technique over the others, as their performance is highly
dependent on the attacks and the use case considered. It is
commonly observed that anti-spoofing methods fail to per-
form consistently across databases, experimenting a signif-
icant loss of accuracy when they are tested under different
conditions to those for which they were designed. As such,
usually the best results are achieved through the combination
of several complementary algorithms or features, so that the
weaknesses of some are covered by the strengths of others
and viceversa [54], [130].
1) FACE ANTI-SPOOFING: FEATURE LEVEL
DYNAMIC APPROACHES
One of the pioneer feature-level protection approaches in
2D face recognition appeared as a countermeasure to the
first attacks studied which made use of static face printouts
(i.e., print attacks). Such anti-spoofing techniques, which
still remain quite popular against print attacks, rely on the
detection of motion over a face video sequence. In particular,
they are based on the trajectory analysis of specific face
segments. Such dynamic features reveal valuable information
to discriminate between real faces and spoofed static copies.
Typical cues used in this type of anti-spoofing methods,
some of them involving challenge-response strategies, are:
eye blinking [119], [123], [131]–[133]; face and head ges-
tures (e.g., nodding, smiling, looking in different directions)
detected trough face and gaze tracking [134], [135] or through
optical flow estimation [27], [103], [136], [137]. These tech-
niques are usually highly effective to detect photo-attacks but
lose accuracy against illegal access attempts carried out with
replayed videos where not only the face appearance but also
its movements are forged.
In order to overcome this shortcoming, some dynamic
liveness detection techniques have been specifically proposed
to detect video-based attacks: exploiting the 3D structure
of the face through the analysis of several 2D images with
different head poses [124], [138]; using context-based anal-
ysis in order to take advantage of non-facial information
available from acquired samples such as motion features
from the scene (e.g., background vs foreground
motion) [59], [139]–[141]; estimating the noise produced
during the recapturing process (i.e., fixed pattern noise and
the noise resulting from the photo-responsiveness of non-
uniform light-sensitive cells) [142]; using modified versions
of the popular Local Binary Patterns (LBP), in order to
take into account temporal information present in video
sequences [125] or to analyse the dynamics of facial texture
in comparison to rigid objects such as photos or masks [143];
applying the recently proposed Eulerian video magnification
algorithm to enhance motion in video as a previous step to
anti-spoofing feature extraction [126].
Given that they are designed to exploit both spatial and
temporal information of face videos, dynamic-based anti-
spoofing schemes usually achieve very competitive perfor-
mance. However, as a limitation, they cannot be used in
systemswhere only a single face image of the user is available
(e.g., passport related applications). Moreover, even in
scenarios where video data has been recorded (e.g., surveil-
lance applications), it is not rare to find that only a very few
non-consecutive frames are suitable for facial analysis, which
also limits their final use and accuracy.
2) FACE ANTI-SPOOFING: FEATURE LEVEL
STATIC APPROACHES
As mentioned on the previous section, dynamic anti-spoofing
schemes need a temporal face sequence of sufficient duration
to achieve high accuracy. This restriction has motivated the
appearance of a second group of approaches for the detection
of spoofing access attempts to 2D face recognition systems,
focused on the analysis of a single static image and not of
video data. These techniques are in general faster than their
dynamic counterparts and, therefore, more convenient for the
user, at the cost, in some cases, of a certain performance loss.
The vast majority of feature-level static methods are based
on the analysis of the face texture using different image
processing tools such as: the Fourier Spectrum [144];
multiple Difference of Gaussian (DoG) filters to extract
specific frequency information [105] which has also been
combined with features obtained from the Lambertian
model [102] proving remarkable performance even under bad
illumination conditions [111]; partial least squares to anal-
yse specific information from low-level descriptors [145];
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TABLE 2. Summary of the most relevant face anti-spoofing techniques presented in Sect. III. Column ‘‘subtype’’ shows the algorithm subtype within each
of the three main categories considered in the work (sensor-level, feature-level and score-level) as shown in the taxonomy in Fig. 3. Column ‘‘attack’’
refers to the type of face spoofing attacks considered in the work as defined in Sect. III-A: photo, video or mask attacks. for clarity, public databases are
just referenced the first time they appear in the table, in successive entries only their name is given (for further information on these public databases
please see Sect. IV-C). Database sizes that appear in column ‘‘database’’ are approximate and are given just as an indication of their order of magnitude
(for the exact structure and size the reader should consult the corresponding reference). The same applies for results, as the ones shown in the table are
an approximation of the different scenarios considered in each work. Works are ordered chronologically within the same subtype.
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TABLE 3. Coarse comparison of the advantages and drawbacks of the three main groups of face spoofing countermeasures reviewed
in Sects III-B.1, III-B.2 and III-B.3. The table should be understood only as a very general reference. for specific details on a particular
algorithm the reader should refer to the corresponding reference.
combination of low-level and high-level face component
descriptors [146]; a recent trend based on the use of Local
Binary Patterns (LBP) to detect photo-attacks [104], [147],
which has been successfully combined with other tex-
ture descriptors such as Gabor Wavelets and with shape
related information extracted using Histogram Oriented
Gradients (HOG) in [127]; detection of paper microtex-
tures present in print-attacks either by analysing the spec-
ular components of the facial image [148] or by using
LBPs as features [104], [149]; as in the case of video
sequences, context-based approaches have also been pro-
posed for the static scenario, focusing in this case on the
detection of the user’s upper body and the attack support
(e.g., paper or tablet) [128]; or pixel difference evaluation
between two consecutive pictures taken with different focus
values [150] (although this last method requires two different
face images, we include it in the static category as it does not
use any temporal information).
These static-based anti-spoofing approaches may as well
be applied to the case in which a video sequence is available.
In this scenario, the analysis is performed on a frame-by-
frame basis, using fusion techniques (e.g., majority voting)
in a later stage to combine the individual scores obtained
from each frame in order to generate a unique final deci-
sion. Although such a strategy is feasible, in general, it
is less efficient than the schemes specifically designed to
work with videos, as no temporal information is exploited
(e.g., trajectories of facial features).
Some of the previous techniques have been successfully
fused at feature level showing improved accuracy compared
to individual parameters [119], [151]. A comparative study of
several of these dynamic and static approaches may be found
in the 2011 and 2013 Competitions on Countermeasures to
2D facial spoofing attacks [54], [130], where it was shown
that, wherever possible (i.e., scenarios with availability of
facial video data), the feature-level fusion of both types of
techniques (static and dynamic) draws the best performance.
Further reading on the results and databases used in these
competitions may be found in Sect. IV-C.
3) FACE ANTI-SPOOFING: SENSOR LEVEL APPROACHES
Regarding sensor-level anti-spoofing techniques, the number
of contributions is still not comparable to that of software-
based approaches. However, some interesting methods have
been proposed base on imaging technology outside the visual
spectrum, such as: complementary infrared (IR) or near
infrared (NIR) images, which are even claimed to provide
sufficient information to distinguish between identical
twins [129], [152]; comparing the reflectance information of
real faces and fake materials using a specific set-up of LEDs
and photodiodes at two different wavelengths [106], [120].
In addition to the previous works, there are other technolo-
gies, initially proposed for personal authentication purposes,
that could also be used as sensor-level anti-spoofing tech-
niques. Although in most cases no rigorous study has yet been
carried out regarding their performance under liveness detec-
tion scenarios, such potentially useful mechanisms for face
anti-spoofing would include: thermal imaging [153], [154],
detection of the facial vein pattern [155], or 3D face acqui-
sition [156]. For instance, 3D sensors can be very robust
against attacks carried out with flat surfaces (e.g., photo
or video attacks) as almost no depth difference is detected
compared to real faces. On the other hand, their performance
under mask-attacks has just started to be investigated using
texture analysis inspired on 2D protection methods based on
LBPs [157], [158] and also on the analysis of the reflectance
components that can be computed from 3D scans [121].
Similarly, systems based on the detection of the face ther-
mogram would be, in principle, very accurate detecting all
three types of major face spoofing attacks (i.e., photo, video
and mask attacks), as no thermal difference is expected in
fake faces. Some initial efforts to study thermal imaging
for liveness detection have already been carried out [159],
including the acquisition of a significantly large database of
thermal images for standard and disguised access attempts
where very promising results have been obtained [122]. Still,
it would be necessary to capture further face thermogram
data under normal operational conditions and under spoofing
attacks in order to validate these initial findings.
The fact that these techniques (i.e., 3D and thermal face
recognition) already present solid backgrounds for personal
authentication, can become an added advantage for their
development as security enhancing alternatives, since both
tasks (i.e., recognition and anti-spoofing) could be performed
from the same sample.
Multimodality has also been explored as a sensor-
level liveness detection approach. Many multibiometric
anti-spoofing techniques consider the combination of face
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and voice, as they are two easily measurable traits. Such
methods exploit the correlation between the lips movement
and the speech being produced [116], [160]–[162] or use
specific information obtained from the lip movement in the
utterance of a preassigned pin code [163].
The latter method could also be classified in the challenge-
response category, as the user is asked to respond to a system
command. Other studied challenge-response strategies con-
sider voluntary eye blinking and mouth movement following
a request from the system [119] (included in the present
survey among the feature-level dynamic-based approaches,
see Sect. III-B.1).
4) FACE ANTI-SPOOFING: SCORE LEVEL APPROACHES
Recently, some research has also been carried out in the field
of score-level anti-spoofing strategies for 2D face recognition
systems. In one of these first works, the authors study the
impact of anti-spoofing measures on the performance of
practical face recognition systems. To this end, they anal-
yse different score fusion techniques for the protection and
authentication modules under a three-case classification sce-
nario: clients, impostors and spoofing attacks [164]. In addi-
tion, several fusion strategies for the combination of outputs
from anti-spoofing modules have been analysed in order to
reduce the performance gap that can be observed when the
evaluation database is changed [165]. Following a similar
trend, the combination of scores given by dynamic-based and
static-based anti-spoofing approaches has also been consid-
ered in [66] and [67], showing a very significant improve-
ment with respect to the individual systems, even for simple
classifiers.
In order to give a general overview of the different meth-
ods studied so far in face anti-spoofing, Table 2 presents a
summary of some illustrative works referenced in the present
section. The table should be understood as a tool for quick
reference and in no case as a strict comparative study, since
results shown in the last column have been obtained on differ-
ent databases. The objective of the table is to schematically
show the most relevant characteristics (i.e., type of anti-
spoofing system, type of features used, evaluation database,
results, etc.) of several representative articles, in order to help
readers to gain, at a glance, an overall perspective of the
different approaches studied so far in the field of face anti-
spoofing. For an exhaustive and complete list of all published
articles in the area the reader should refer to the inline text in
this Sect. III.
For further details on anti-spoofing evaluation, large pub-
licly available datasets and comparative results from the
face anti-spoofing competitions organized so far, readers are
referred to Sect. IV.
IV. ANTI-SPOOFING EVALUATION
‘‘In God we trust; all others must bring data’’. This quote
commonly attributed to William Edwards Deming7 may be
7(W.E.D, 1900-1993). On the Web, this quote has been widely attributed
to Deming, however, as stated in the introduction of [168]: ironically enough,
we could find no ‘‘data’’ confirming this end.
applied to the evaluation of any machine learning or pattern
recognition problem. Furthermore, these data should be pub-
lic so that results can be reproduced and fairly compared, in
order to avoid reaching the situation illustrated by another
well known machine learning principle: give me the perfor-
mance figure you want to reach and I will provide you the
database that meets it.
Certainly, one of the key challenges faced nowadays by
the rapidly evolving biometric industry is the need for pub-
licly available standard datasets that permit the objective
and reproducible evaluation of different aspects related to
biometric recognition systems (e.g., performance, security,
interoperability or privacy). This is particularly relevant for
the assessment of spoofing attacks and their corresponding
anti-spoofing protection methodologies.
In addition to data acquisition and distribution another
key factor for developing the anti-spoofing technology is the
organization of competitive evaluations. Such contests give
a clear snapshot of systems performance at a given point
and help to achieve a better understanding of the different
algorithms accuracy. Furthermore, most public datasets are
acquired in the framework of such competitions.
The next sections review: (i) important aspects related
to general anti-spoofing database acquisition (Sect. IV-A);
(ii) overall characteristics of anti-spoofing evaluation
campaigns (Sect. IV-B); and (iii) the general context for
anti-spoofing assessment introduced in the previous two
sections is particularized for the case of face anti-spoofing
in Sect. IV-C.
A. ANTI-SPOOFING DBS: GENERAL ASPECTS
The present section gives an overview of the current pub-
licly available anti-spoofing databases that may be used for
the development and evaluation of new protection measures
against direct attacks in the field of face recognition. Results
from the latest face anti-spoofing competitive evaluations are
also given for reference in order to provide an updated view
of face anti-spoofing performance as of today.
In relation to spoofing, only recently has the biometric
community started to devote some important efforts to the
acquisition of large and statistically meaningful anti-spoofing
databases. In most cases, these datasets have been generated
in the framework of international evaluation competitions
such as the series of Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competi-
tions, LivDet, held biennially since 2009 [55], [169], [170], or
themore recent 2DFaceAnti-Spoofing contests that started in
2011 [54], [130]. Such initiatives provide public benchmarks
for developers and researchers to objectively evaluate their
proposed anti-spoofing solutions and compare them to other
existing or future approaches. This way, the public availabil-
ity of standardized datasets is fundamental for the evolution
of the state-of-the-art.
In spite of the increasing interest in the study of vulnera-
bilities to direct attacks, the availability of spoofing databases
is still scarce. This may be explained from both a technical
and a legal point of view. (i) From a technical perspective,
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the acquisition of spoofing-related data presents an added
challenge to the usual difficulties encountered in the acqui-
sition of standard biometric databases (i.e., time-consuming,
expensive, human resources needed, cooperation from the
data subjects. . . ): the generation of a large amount of fake
artefacts which are inmany cases tedious and slow to generate
on large scale (e.g., face masks, gummy fingers, or printed iris
lenses). (ii) Legal aspects related to data protection make the
distribution of biometric databases among research groups or
industries tedious and difficult. These legal restrictions have
forced most laboratories working in the field of spoofing to
acquire their own proprietary (and usually small) datasets
on which to evaluate their protection methods. Although
these are valuable efforts, they have limited scientific impact,
since results may not be compared or reproduced by other
researchers.
Both public and proprietary datasets acquired for anti-
spoofing evaluation are generally constructed according to
one of the following three approaches:
• Different Real/Fake Users. The spoofing database is
constructed using real samples of a previously existing
dataset. Then, fake samples of different new users are
added. Anti-spoofing is a two class classification prob-
lem, therefore, from a theoretical point of view, such an
approach is valid for the evaluation of liveness detection
techniques, as the database contains samples of both
classes. However, this type of database is not advisable
and should be avoided, as it presents two major prob-
lems: on one hand, it has the limitation of not allowing
spoofing vulnerability studies where the intruder tries
to access the system using a fake biometric trait of a
genuine user (as real and fake samples were not pro-
duced by the same subjects); on the other hand, real and
fake samples do not only correspond to different persons
but may have also been acquired with different sensors,
at different locations, or following different protocols,
which could potentially lead to biased results. Examples
of works using such databases are [28], [171], and [172].
• Same Real/Fake Users, But Different Acquisition
Conditions. As in the previous case, the spoofing
database is constructed based on real samples of a previ-
ous dataset. However, in this case, those real samples are
the ones used to produce the fake spoofs, consequently,
both real and fake users coincide. This could be, for
instance, the case of a face spoofing database where the
artefacts used to carry out the fraudulent access attempts
are printed photographs of an already publicly available
real face image database. Again, the problem in this case
is that anti-spoofing evaluation results may be biased due
to changes in the acquisition environment (e.g., sensor,
illumination, distance to the sensor, pose, pressure,
size, resolution, etc.) In such conditions, liveness detec-
tion algorithms may detect those contextual variations,
and not the intrinsic differences between real and fake
samples. Examples of works using such databases
include [111], [173], and [174].
• Same Real/Fake Users and Same Acquisition
Conditions. This is the most advisable way to proceed
in an anti-spoofing evaluation. In this case, the database
is captured from scratch for the same real and fake
users under the same acquisition environment. Most
of the works presented in the face literature review in
Sect. III and all the competitive anti-spoofing evaluation
campaigns follow this approach.
B. ANTI-SPOOFING EVALUATION CAMPAIGNS:
GENERAL ASPECTS
In the area of anti-spoofing assessment, as in other biometric-
related scenarios [175], two main types of evaluations are
possible: (i) algorithm-based, also referred in the literature
as technology evaluation [175], thought to evaluate liveness
detection modules or algorithms, independently of the rest of
the system. This type of evaluation is therefore well suited to
assess feature-level techniques; (ii) system-based, also known
as scenario evaluation [175], designed to evaluate biometric
systems as a whole, including the scanner. Adequate therefore
to assess sensor-level schemes where acquisition devices are
specific for each system.
The advantage of algorithm-based evaluations is that the
same data and protocol may be used to assess all tech-
niques. Furthermore, this benchmark can be made public,
so that future software-based methods may be directly com-
pared to the evaluation results. On the other hand, system-
based evaluations are just restricted to the scope of a given
competition, and no further comparison may be established
with future systems, as new data would have to be acquired
for each specific sensor. That is, due to their intrinsic
hardware-based nature, it is not possible to acquire a
single distributable database that satisfies the particular hard-
ware acquisition requirements of each different sensor-based
approach.
However, it is important to highlight that it is possible
to carry out competitive evaluations of complete liveness
detection systems (including the acquisition sensor) and not
just of independent anti-spoofing algorithms or modules.
Such system-based evaluations have already started up at the
fingerprint LivDet 2011 and 2013 and at the iris LivDet 2013
competitions [55], [56], [170]. In these three contests, the two
evaluation modalities mentioned above (i.e., algorithm- and
sensor-based) were offered to the participants: (i) submis-
sion of anti-spoofing software-based algorithms (i.e., only
the liveness detection module), that were evaluated on the
same prerecorded data following the same protocol (now
publicly available); (ii) submission of complete functional
biometric systems, that were tested on the spot performing
a fixed number of real access attempts and spoofing access
attempts (i.e., direct attacks), carried out with the same, or
very similar artefacts to those used for the generation of
the software-based database. In the latter case, a number of
important factors should be taken into account in order to
obtain comparable results: using the same spoofs to evaluate
all systems, enrolling the same live subjects, same acquisition
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conditions (e.g., background, pose or illumination),
controlling the possible spoofs degradation.
Compared to algorithm-based evaluations, system-based
ones provide a better estimation of the anti-spoofing capa-
bilities of fully functional biometric systems, and not just of
liveness detection algorithms. Such type of assessment also
gives very valuable information regarding the real robustness
against spoofing of commercial biometric applicationswhich,
in practice, are released as a complete finalized product and
not as a group of independent modules. Furthermore, system-
based evaluations represent a closer approximation to spoof-
ing attacks that could be carried out in a real-world scenario.
Another important observation worth highlighting in the
field of anti-spoofing assessment, is the distribution of fake
samples across datasets. Up to date, in all algorithm-based
competitions that have been organised (two in face, three in
fingerprint and one in iris), the train and test sets distributed
to the participants contained the same type of spoofs. This
means that algorithms may be trained on the same type of
data that will later be used for testing. However, in a real
operational scenario, algorithms have to face artefacts which
are unknown to them. This way, results obtained under lab-
oratory conditions may be an optimistic estimate of the real
performance of the anti-spoofing methods being tested.
This potential bias in the evaluation results between labora-
tory and real environments was addressed in the systems cat-
egory of the LivDet 2011 and 2013 competitions [55], [170].
In these two contests, participants did not receive any training
data and were just given some general information about
the three types of spoofs that would be used to attack their
systems. Then, in the testing phase, in addition to these three
known artefacts, two more, totally new to the systems, were
also used for evaluation. A similar approach could be fol-
lowed in algorithms-based assessment by limiting the diver-
sity of fake training data compared to that used for testing.
C. FACE ANTI-SPOOFING EVALUATION AND DATABASES
Based on the general context for anti-spoofing evaluation
described above (see Sects. IV-A and IV-B), the present
section gives an overview of he current exiting initiatives in
face anti-spoofing assessment with special attention to public
databases and competition results.
Currently there are six large public face anti-spoofing
databases that comprise most attacking scenarios described
in Sect. III-A: the NUAA PI DB, the YALE-RECAPTURED
DB, the PRINT-ATTACK DB, the CASIA FAS DB, the
REPLAY-ATTACK DB and the 3D MASK-ATTACK DB
(described in the following subsections). The chronology of
all six databases illustrates in a very good manner the state-
of-the-art evolution in the field of face spoofing and anti-
spoofing, showing how attacks have become gradually more
sophisticated and how protection methods have adapted to the
new challenges in order to increase their accuracy.
The first effort to generate a large public face anti-spoofing
DB was reported in [102] with the NUAA PI DB, which
contains still-images of real access attempts and print-attacks
of 15 users. The YALE-RECAPTURED DB appeared soon
after, and added the difficulty of varying illumination con-
ditions as well as considering LCD spoofs (i.e., the attacks
were carried out showing face images on LCD screens)
instead of classic print attempts [111]. This database, how-
ever, is still quite restricted in terms of number of users (10),
and it only comprises real and fake static images.
Furthermore, it was captured from an already existing dataset
(the Yale Face DB-B), with the limitations entailed as dis-
cussed in Sect. IV-A. The PRINT-ATTACKDB represents yet
another step in the evolution of face spoofing, both in terms
of size (50 different users were captured) and of data acquired
(it contains video sequences instead of still images). However,
it still only considers the case of photo attacks [59]. This
feature is improved by both the REPLAY-ATTACK DB [54]
and the CASIA FAS DB [105], which contain not only
photo attacks with different supports (e.g., paper, mobile
phones and tablets) but also replay video attacks. In addition,
these last two databases are complementary, as the
REPLAY-ATTACK DB was acquired with one single sensor
using different attack devices of increasing quality under
varying illumination and background conditions, while the
CASIA FAS DB was captured with sensors of different
quality under a uniform acquisition setting. To date, the last
contribution in the field of public face spoofing databases, is
the 3D MASK-ATTACK DB [109], which has initiated the
path of 3D face acquisition under mask attacks (all previous
datasets comprise only 2D data and photo or video attacks).
Table 5 shows a comparison of the most important features of
these six face spoofing databases.
From the six previous databases, the REPLAY-ATTACK
DB is probably the most significant one, not only for its size,
multiple and well defined protocols and attacks covered, but
also because it was used in the last edition of the Competition
on Countermeasures to 2D Facial Spoofing Attacks held in
2013 [54]. For these reasons, as an illustrative example of
spoofing attacks carried out against face recognition systems,
in Fig. 5 we show some typical images (frames extracted from
videos) of real and fake access attempts from the REPLAY-
ATTACK DB (mobile, print and highdef attack scenarios are
defined in Sect. IV-C.5).
For completeness, the results of the 2013 Competition on
Countermeasures to 2D Facial Spoofing Attacks are shown
in Table 4, in terms of the percentage of correctly classified
samples. All the information in this table has been directly
extracted from [54]. We refer the reader to that work for
further details on the competition.
The contest only considered an algorithm-based evalua-
tion, therefore, only feature-level approaches were submitted
(see Sect. IV-B for a general classification and characteris-
tics of anti-spoofing evaluations). The competition database
(a subset of the REPLAY-ATTACK DB) was divided into:
a train set, to tune and train the algorithms; a development
set, to fix the decision threshold between real and fake
classes; and a test set, where the final results were computed.
The same spoofs were present in all three sets.
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FIGURE 5. Typical examples of real and fake (mobile, print and highdef
attacks) face images that can be found in the public REPLAY-ATTACK DB.
Images were extracted from videos acquired in two illumination and
background scenarios: controlled and adverse. For further details on
types of attacks and acquisition settings please see Sect. IV-C.5.
The last column of Table 4 shows, in percentage, the
algorithms accuracy on the test set, computed as 100-HTER,
where HTER stands for the Half Total Error Rate. The pre-
vious two columns indicate the feature classes (static or
dynamic) used by each of the algorithms. The results show
that the fusion of static and dynamic features draws the best
results, with the two top algorithms reaching 100% accuracy
even under the multiple attack scenario that was featured in
the competition: several illumination and background condi-
tions, different spoof devices (print, mobile phone, tablet) and
different attacking methods (photo, video). Interestingly, the
best static-based algorithms are able to perform almost at the
same level as the fused approaches, with a 99% classification
rate, significantly higher than the only dynamic technique that
was presented to the competition, algorithm 2,which obtained
an accuracy of 91%.
1) NUAA PI DB
The NUAA Photograph Imposter DB [102] is publicly avail-
able from the Pattern Recognition and Neural Computing
Group of the Nanjing University of Aeronautics an Astronau-
tics (ParNeC-NUAA).8
This database contains still images of both real-access and
spoofing attack attempts of 15 subjects. Samples are extracted
8http://parnec.nuaa.edu.cn/xtan/data/NUAAImposterDB.html
TABLE 4. Results obtained by the 8 algorithms that participated in the
2013 competition on countermeasures to 2D facial spoofing attacks.
HTER stands for half total error rate. for a more detailed description of
the database used in the evaluation please see Sect. IV-C.5. The
information displayed in the table has been directly extracted from [54].
from videos captured with a cheap generic webcam (the
model is not specified) with a resolution of 640× 480 pixels.
The database was acquired under uncontrolled illumination
conditions in three different sessions separated two weeks
from each other. The amount of data among sessions is
unbalanced as not all the subjects participated in the three
acquisition campaigns.
During real access attempts, subjects were asked to stay
as still as possible with no evident face movements such as
eye blinking, in order to simulate the characteristics of typical
print attacks.
All attacks were carried out with printed copies of high
definition face close-ups of the users, captured with a stan-
dard Canon camera (model is not specified). Three different
hard-copies of each photograph were generated to attack the
system: (i) professional developing on photographic paper of
size 6.8cm × 10.2cm; (ii) professional developing on photo-
graphic paper of size 8.9cm × 12.7cm; (iii) home generated
copy using a standard color ink HP printer and A4 70gr paper.
During the attacks the printed images were moved in different
forms, trying to imitate the typical behaviour of real access
attempts: back and forth, vertically and horizontally, slightly
warped around in the vertical and horizontal axis.
The database is divided into a train and a test set: the
train set comprises images from the two first acquisition
sessions, while the test set only contains samples of the last
one, therefore there is no overlap between them in terms of
samples. However, some users do appear in both sets.
2) YALE-RECAPTURED DB
The YALE-RECAPTURED database [111] is publicly avail-
able under request from the University of Campinas.9
The dataset consists of 640 static images of real access
attempts and 1,920 attack samples, acquired from 10 differ-
ent users. The genuine subset is taken from the previously
existing Yale Face DB-B [176], where each user was acquired
under 64 different illumination conditions.
Attack attempts were carried out displaying real images
on three different LCD monitors: i) LG Flatron L196WTQ
9http://www.ic.unicamp.br/r˜ocha/
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TABLE 5. Comparative summary of the most relevant features corresponding to the six face spoofing databases described in Sect. IV-C. # indicates
number, Samp stands for samples, LQ for 2D low quality, SQ for 2D standard quality, HQ for 2D high quality, Ph for photo, Vd for video, Mk for mask,
Hh for handheld, Fx for fixed, Cont for controlled and Adv for adverse.
Wide 19’’, ii) a CTL 171Lx 1700 TFT, and iii) a DELL
Inspiron 1545 notebook. Then, the images were recaptured
with two different cameras, a Kodak C813 with a resolution
of 8.2 megapixels and a Samsung Omnia i900 of
5 megapixels. After the recapture process, samples were
cropped and normalized to grey-scale images of size 64×64.
The multiple illumination conditions make this database a
quite challenging one. However, since the genuine and fake
subsets were acquired in different settings and with different
devices, results obtained on it may be biased due to these
contextual differences (see Sect. IV-B for further reading on
anti-spoofing databases acquisition).
3) PRINT-ATTACK DB
The PRINT-ATTACKdatabase [59] is publicly available from
the IDIAP Research Institute website10. This database was
used on the 2011 Competition on Countermeasures to 2D
Facial Spoofing Attacks [130].
It consists of 200 videos of real accesses and 200 videos of
print attack attempts from 50 different users. The database
is divided into a train, a development and a test set which
coincide with those used in the 2011 competition.
Real and attack access video sequences were captured with
a 320× 240 pixel (QVGA) resolution camera of a MacBook
laptop, at 25 frames-per-second with an average duration
of around 10 seconds and stored in mov format. Videos
were recorded under two different background and illumi-
nation conditions: i) controlled, with a uniform background
and indoor homogeneous lighting coming from a fluorescent
lamp; ii) adverse, in this case the background is not uniform
(regular office-like background) and the scene has day-light
illumination.
Attacks were carried out with hard copies of high resolu-
tion photographs of the 50 users, printed on plain A4 paper
with a Triumph-Adler DCC 2520 color laser printer. The
photographs were taken during real access attempts, under
the same illumination and background setting, with a 12.1
megapixel Canon PowerShot SX150 IS camera. For the
attacks, printouts are held in front of the acquisition sensor
(i.e., MacBook laptop camera) using two different supports:
10http://www.idiap.ch/dataset/printattack
hand-held attack (i.e., the intruder holds the photograph with
his hands) or fixed support attack (i.e., pictures are stuck to
the wall so that there is no movement).
4) CASIA FAS DB
The CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing DB [105] is publicly avail-
able from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CASIA) Center
for Biometrics and Security Research (CASIA-CBSR).11
This database contains short videos (around 10 seconds in
avi format) of both real-access and spoofing attack attempts
of 50 subjects, divided into a train and a test set with no over-
lap between them (in terms of users and samples). Samples
were acquired with three devices with different resolutions:
i) low resolution, with an old 640 × 480 USB web camera
(model is not specified); ii) normal resolution, with a modern
480 × 640 USB web camera (model is not specified); and
iii) high resolution, using a 1920 × 1080 Sony NEX-5 high
definition camera.
Three different attacks were considered: i) warped, illegal
access attempts are carried out with slightly curved hard
copies on copper paper (which has a higher quality than
regular A4 printing paper) of high-resolution digital pho-
tographs of the genuine users (taken with the Sony NEX-5
camera); ii) cut, the attacks are performed using hard copies
of high-resolution digital photographs of the genuine users
(as before), where the eyes have been cut out and the face
of the attacker is placed behind (i.e., so that eye blinking is
forged); iii) video, in this case high resolution videos of the
genuine users are replayed in front of the acquisition device
using an iPad.
5) REPLAY-ATTACK DB
The REPLAY-ATTACK DB [104] is publicly available at the
IDIAP Research Institute website.12
The database was acquired as an extension of the PRINT-
ATTACK DB, therefore it also contains short videos (around
10 seconds in mov format) of both real-access and spoof-
ing attack attempts of 50 different subjects, acquired with a
320×240 resolution webcam of a 13-inch MacBook Laptop.
The recordings were carried out under two different
11http://www.cbsr.ia.ac.cn/english/index.asp
12http://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack
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conditions: i) controlled, with a uniform background and
artificial lighting; and ii) adverse, with natural illumination
and non-uniform background.
In this case three different attacks with an increasing
level of resolution were considered: (i) print, illegal access
attempts are carried out with hard copies of high-resolution
digital photographs (this data subset corresponds to the
PRINT-ATTACK DB described in Sect. IV-C.3); (ii) mobile,
attacks are performed using photos and videos taken with
the iPhone using the iPhone 4 screen; iii) highdef, similar
to the mobile subset but in this case the photos and videos
are displayed using an iPad screen with a 1024 × 768 pixel
resolution.
In addition, access attempts in the three attack subsets
(mobile, print and highdef) were recorded in two different
modes depending on the strategy followed to hold the attack
replay device (mobile phone, paper or tablet): (i) hand-based,
and (ii) fixed-support.
The database is distributed with an associated protocol
which divides the database into a train, a development and
a test set with no overlap between them (in terms of users and
samples). The database also contains an enrollment subset
with 100 videos corresponding only to real access attempts.
This subset is provided as a means to evaluate the recognition
performance of systems whose vulnerabilities to spoofing
attacks will be later evaluated on the rest of the database.
The 2013 edition of the Competition on Countermeasures
to 2D Facial Spoofing Attacks was held using a subset of
all the available attacks on the REPLAY-ATTACK DB (not
just the print data as in the 2011 edition). The exact data and
protocol followed on this second edition are also releasedwith
the database [54]. The results of the competition are given
in Table 4.
6) 3D MASK-ATTACK DB
The 3D MASK-ATTACK DB [107], [109] is publicly avail-
able at the IDIAP Research Institute website.13 It constitutes
the first public database that considers mask attacks and that,
in addition to 2D data, provides as well depth information.
It comprises genuine and attack access attempts of 17 dif-
ferent users. The attacks were performed by one single oper-
ator wearing the real-size 3D masks of the genuine subjects.
Masks were manufactured using the service provided by
ThatsMyFace.com,14 which only requires a frontal and two
profile pictures of each person to generate a 3D mask. These
three pictures (frontal and profiles) are also distributed with
the database.
The database was captured in three different sessions:
two real-access sessions held two weeks apart and a third
session in which the mask attacks were performed. In each
session and for each user, five videos of 10 seconds
were captured using the Microsoft Kinect for Xbox 360.
This sensor provides both regular 2D RGB data (8-bit) and
13https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack
14http://www.thatsmyface.com/
depth data (11-bit), with a resolution of 640 × 480 pixels at
30 frames per second.
Therefore, the data available are: 255 color videos of
300 frames (170 real sequences and 85 mask attacks), and
as many 2.5D sequences with the corresponding depth infor-
mation. Such diversity of data permits a great flexibility for
research in the field of face security to direct attacks, since it
gives the possibility to study both 2D and 3D anti-spoofing
algorithms and their fusion.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION: LESSONS, FACTS
AND CHALLENGES
In ‘‘Skyfall’’, the latest movie in the James Bond saga, 007
is given a gun that only he can fire: It works by recognising
his palmprint, rendering it useless when it falls into a baddy’s
hands. This is just another example of the multiple uses
which have been given to biometrics in films, TV and books,
in most cases assuming a zero-error and perfect security
performance.
However, as usually happens in terms of technical
advances, reality is still some distance away from fiction:
‘‘On September 2013, the world witnessed a long anticipated
event, heralding a paradigm shift in mobile security: Apple’s
launch of the new iPhone 5S with a fingerprint reader under-
neath the home button. The use case: to unlock the phone
and authorize purchases in Apple’s iStore. One day after
the iPhone hit the shelves, a hacker team claimed to have
circumvented the biometric system through getting the phone
to accept a fake ‘spoofed’ fingerprint.’’ [177]
As reviewed in the present work, a great amount of research
has been carried out concerning the vulnerabilities of bio-
metric systems to direct attacks and multiple techniques to
secure them against this threat have been proposed.Moreover,
different independent evaluations have shown that some of
these protection techniques are able to achieve very competi-
tive results when assessed in laboratory conditions. However,
in spite of all these efforts, commercial products, even those
developed by the most advanced technological companies,
keep failing to withstand the challenges posed by hackers.
How can this situation be explained? Like in most cases, a
simple answer is not possible as a number of factors have
contributed to reach the current status.
On one hand, in all issues related to spoofing, the biometric
community has followed from the beginning the security
through transparency principle, first formulated in the field of
cryptography and then generalized to all other security areas
as ‘‘the enemy knows your system’’ [178]. This principle states
that the fewer and simpler the things one needs to keep secret
in order to ensure the security of a given system, the easier it
is to maintain that security. In other words, there is no point
in trying to deny or cover the vulnerabilities of biometric sys-
tems to spoofing because, sooner or later, attackers will dis-
cover them and the consequences will be unpredictable [179].
Therefore, quoting the Biometric Working Group already in
2003: ‘‘public exposure of countermeasures and vulnerabili-
ties will lead to a more mature and responsible attitude from
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the biometrics community and promote the development of
more secure systems in the future’’ [180]. Such a philosophy
will undoubtedly pay off in the long-run, however, in the short
term, each user becomes a potential andwell-informed hacker
every time a new biometric product is released, which leads
to situations such as the one described for the iPhone 5S.
On the other hand, although some efforts have been made
in the frame of the Common Criteria [41], [181] and there is
on-going work to release the first ISO standard specifically
focused on spoofing [42], still no largely extended standard
exists regarding the evaluation of biometric vulnerabilities.
This has resulted in very sparse certifications of biometric-
based security commercial products compared to other tech-
nologies with a long standardization trajectory such as smart
cards or cryptography [45]–[47]. A clear and well defined
certification methodology to assess biometric security would
certainly help developers in designing more robust and reli-
able systems.
Also, we should not forget that the ‘‘worst case scenario’’
is specially sensitive in spoofing. Let’s take for instance
the example of face. It is not rare to find that an anti-
spoofing technique is extremely accurate detecting certain
spoofs (e.g., printed images), but that consistently fails when
it is confronted with a different type of fake artefacts
(e.g., videos), referred to in some cases as ‘‘golden fakes’’.
In a real case, if the attacker finds this vulnerability, and
following the transparency principle it should be assumed that
he will, the system will be compromised. In this worst case
scenario, even if the anti-spoofing method, on average, has an
extremely high performance, the reality is that it will be easily
spoofed.
The ‘‘worst case scenario’’ presented above for face can
be extended to all biometric traits, and makes spoofing eval-
uation a very difficult matter. It is especially challenging to
recreate real attacking conditions in a laboratory evaluation.
Under controlled conditions, systems are tested against a
restricted number of typical spoofing artefacts, as it is unfea-
sible to collect a database with all the different possibilities
that may be found in the market. Furthermore, assessment
databases are usually divided into a train and a test set in
which both of them contain examples of the same spoofs,
therefore, protection techniques can be specifically tuned on
the train set to detect what they already know will be present
in the test set. However, the real world represents an open set
evaluation with no constraints on the spoofs used to attack.
In this scenario, what can be expected from the performance
of protection techniques against any type of spoof and not
only those for which it has been trained?
In addition to the afore mentioned issues, so far, biometric
spoofing questions have been addressed mainly relying on
empirical testing carried out by individual research groups to
evaluate the performance of specific techniques, often with
small-scale datasets acquired in an ad-hoc way. Although this
learn-by-doing approach allows gaining some insight into the
new spoofing problem, there is still not enough understanding
of how to quantitatively address fundamental performance
tradeoffs and limits, for no ‘‘theory on spoofing’’ has been
established yet.
In the current spoofing context described above, and bear-
ing in mind all lessons learned in more than 10 years of
spoofing research, some still open questions are: Where do
we go from here? What are the future challenges to be faced
in biometric spoofing? What are the issues which still need
to be looked into and further explored? What new lines of
research can be foreseen in this field?
In order to answer these questions, it cannot be neglected
that absolute security does not exist: given funding, willpower
and the proper technology, every security system can be com-
promised. However, there are a number of steps that can be
taken in order to continue improving the security offered by
biometric systems against spoofing attacks, so that the effort
and resources needed to break them, exceed the benefit gained
by the attacker.
Probably, at this stage, one of the most urgent needs is
to define a clear methodology to assess the ‘‘spoofability’’
of systems. This is not a straight forward problem, as there
are new variables involved when the spoofing dimension is
introduced. Although it is not yet generally deployed, an
evaluation protocol which is gaining popularity for the assess-
ment of biometric spoofing, defines two possible working
scenarios [80], [107], [164], [182], [183]:
• Licit Scenario, considered in classic recognition evalua-
tions, it only takes into account genuine access attempts
and zero-effort impostor access attempts. In this sce-
nario performance is typically reported in terms of
the FRR (False Rejection Rate, number of genuine
access attempts wrongly rejected) and the FAR (False
Acceptance Rate, number of zero-effort impostor access
attempts wrongly accepted).
• Spoofing Scenario, in which access attempts are either
genuine or spoofing attacks. Although for this case there
is still no agreed method for reporting results, two met-
rics which have been proposed and are starting to be used
are the FRR (defined as in the licit scenario) and the
SFAR (Spoofing False Acceptance Rate, corresponding
to the number of spoofing attacks wrongly accepted).
All these three metrics (i.e., FRR, FAR and SFAR) should
be strictly assessed before carrying out any further evalu-
ation concerning liveness detection techniques. This way,
the real threat posed by a spoofing database to a certain
recognition system can be determined. When a countermea-
sure is introduced in the system, all three previous measures
should be recomputed considering the anti-spoofing module,
so that they can be compared to the case with no protection
against direct attacks. As such, the real impact of the liveness
detection technique on the system performance can be fully
characterized.
Currently, when it comes to the evaluation of a new anti-
spoofing countermeasure, in most cases, its performance is
measured as an independent module and reported in terms of
its classification rates, usually referred to as FFR (False Fake
Rate, number of real samples classified as fake) and
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FLR (False Living Rate, number of fake samples classified
as real). This stand-alone assessment constitutes a first neces-
sary step towards the evaluation of the countermeasure but, as
specified above, it should be complemented with further anal-
yses. In fact, a liveness detection algorithm will, in general,
not operate on its own, but integrated in a recognition system.
In this framework, to perform an exhaustive assessment, other
questions which are very rarely answered in current state-of-
the-art works, should be addressed: What is the impact of the
FFR and FLR on the system performance (i.e., FRR, FAR
and SFAR)? This issue can be addressed to a great extent
following the two-scenario (i.e., licit and spoofing) evaluation
protocol defined above.
Although the above methodology would already represent
a big advance if it was widely adopted or implemented into
a standard, it still opens some new interesting topics for
research which have just started to be explored: What is the
best way to combine matching and liveness-detection scores
[164], [184]? What would be the impact of this fusion in
multibiometric systems [182]? Can the performance of a sys-
tem under both operating scenarios (i.e., licit and spoofing)
be reported with one single metric? How can the above
two-scenario methodology be generalized to the real case
where all three score classes (i.e., genuine, zero-effort and
spoofing) are present at the same time? Although current
preliminary efforts in the study of spoofing assessment princi-
ples are hugely valuable, there is still quite limited theoretical
foundation in this field to be able to answer some of the fun-
damental questions listed above. Accordingly, the biometric
community needs to confront the existing challenges in order
to build a solid theoretical background that allows further
developing this area.
Another shortcoming of most current anti-spoofing tech-
niques, that should be analysed in the near future, is their
lack of interoperability across databases. To date, the compe-
titions organised have shown that top-ranked algorithms are
able to achieve an accuracy close to 100%, however, their
performance drops significantly when the testing dataset is
changed. An interesting lesson may be learned from these
results: There exists no clearly superior anti-spoofing tech-
nique. Selecting one particular protection method depends on
the nature of the attack scenarios and acquisition conditions.
Therefore, it is important to find complementary countermea-
sures and study the best fusion approaches in order to develop
liveness-detection techniques that succeed at achieving a high
performance over different spoofing data [165], [185].
In addition to the above mentioned research topics aligned
with spoofing fundamental theory, practical studies should
not be forgotten. As technology progresses, new hardware
devices and signal processing techniques continue to emerge.
It is important to keep track of this rapid technological
progress since some of the advances can be the key to develop
novel and efficient anti-spoofing techniques. For example,
just a few years ago, 3D acquisition scanners were unsuitable
for liveness detection purposes due to their cost, size and level
of cooperation required from the user. However, nowadays,
there exist sensors which provide accurate depth information,
with the size of a regular webcam and almost for its same
price. Should they become integrated in biometric readers,
such sensors could become in the near future a definitive
solution against 2D photo and video attacks to face-based
systems.
The anti-spoofing community should also consider engag-
ing in new fundamental research regarding the biological
dimension of biometric traits, in order to break with the
current popular trend embraced by many of the latest research
where some well known sets of features (e.g, LBP, LPQ,
HOG or BSIF) are extracted from images in public databases
and passed through a classifier. Although such a methodol-
ogy is valid, in most cases it brings little new insight into
the spoofing problem. A greater progress could potentially
be obtained from new studies exploiting intrinsic biological
differences between real and fake traits such as, for instance,
the thermogram or the facial blood flow.
The impact of spoofing should also be considered in other
biometric-related fields such as forensics. Sir Arthur
Conan Doyle already foresaw the possibility of fake fin-
gerprint forensic evidence in one of his renowned Sherlock
Holme’s short stories over a century ago [186]. Since
then, different works have tested the ability of foren-
sic examiners to distinguish between real and fake latent
fingerprints [187], [188]. However, only recently have some
interesting research works addressed the automatic detec-
tion of fake finger-marks deliberately left behind at crime
scenes [189]–[191]. This is a research line that can gain a
lot of strength and importance in the years to come.
Another more philosophical question to be addressed in
the field of spoofing, is the balance between security and
convenience. It is undeniable that one of the most impor-
tant motivations, if not the most important reason, for the
deployment and development of biometrics, is its security
dimension. We want to secure access to information and bio-
metrics represents a good alternative: you are your own key.
In this context, spoofing gains great relevance: if the system
is spoofed, the information is compromised. Therefore, it is
clear that spoofing analysis is a key issue in the development
of biometrics. However, it is important to keep in mind the
final product where a biometric system will be integrated
and its ultimate purpose within that product, as security is
just one side of the coin. The other side is convenience. For
certain applications, from the end-user perspective, some risk
of spoofability may be acceptable if, in return, he obtains a
greater gain in convenience. Let’s go back to the iPhone 5S
example. At the end of the day, are we sure it was meant
to be unspoofable (even by simple known methods)? Was it
worth making it more secure at the cost of increasing its price
and the inconvenience to the user (more false rejections)?
If someone is ready to go through the tedious process of lifting
a latent fingerprint and casting a fake finger just to ‘‘unlock
our phone’’, wouldn’t he also be ready to obtain our 4 digit
PIN (perhaps just by looking over our shoulder) if no bio-
metrics were integrated in the device? In fact, it is estimated
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that over 50% of users had not set any security mechanism to
unlock their mobile phones before the introduction by apple
of the convenient fingerprint reader. If such percentage is
decreased with the use of biometrics, it may be argued that
a convenient and spoofable system has increased the overall
security of mobile phones. Yes, the iPhone 5S can be spoofed,
but, in practice, howmany of themwill be spoofed?Wouldn’t
they be hacked all the same without biometrics?
As a wrap up conclusion it may be stated that, although a
great amount of work has been done in the field of spoofing
detection and many advances have been reached, attacking
methodologies have also evolved becoming more and more
sophisticated. As a consequence, there are still big challenges
to be faced in the protection against direct attacks, that will
hopefully lead in the coming years to a new generation of
more secure biometric systems.
In the meanwhile, Mr Bond will still have to wait some
time until he gets a gun that he can fully trust to be the only
one who can fire it.
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